The Fog of War

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Earlier tonight--

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Let me hear your voice level, to make sure it's the same.

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Now, I remember exactly the sentence I left off on.

I remember how it started,

and I was cut off in the middle.

But, you can fix it up someway.

I don't want to go back-- introduce the sentence,

because I know exactly what I wanted to say.

Go ahead! Okay.

Any military commander who is honest with himself,

or with those he's speaking to will admit

that he has made mistakes

in the application of military power.

He's killed people, unnecessarily.

His own troops or other troops.

Through mistakes, through errors of judgment.

A hundred, or thousands, or tens of thousands,

maybe even 100,000.

But he hasn't destroyed nations.

And the conventional wisdom is

don't make the same mistake twice.

Learn from your mistakes.

And we all do.

Maybe we make the same mistake three times,

but hopefully not four or five.

There'll be no learning period with nuclear weapons.

Make one mistake and you're gonna destroy nations.

In my life, I've been part of wars.

Three years in the U.S. Army during World War II.

Seven years as secretary of defense

during the Vietnam War.

Thirteen years at the World Bank. Across the world.

At my age, 85,

I'm at an age where I can look back

and derive some conclusions about my actions.

My rule has been, "try to learn."

Try to understand what happened.

Develop the lessons and pass them on.

This is the Secretary of Defense

of the United States, Robert McNamara.

His department absorbs 10 percent

of the national income of this country

and over half of every tax dollar.

His job has been called the toughest in Washington,

and McNamara is the most controversial figure

that has ever held the job.

Walter Lippmann calls him

not only the best secretary of defense,

but the first one who ever asserted civilian control

over the military.

His critics call him a "con man,"

"an IBM machine with legs"

"an arrogant dictator."

Mr. Secretary, I've noticed in several cabinet offices...

that little silver calendar thing there.

Can you explain that?

Yes, this was given by President Kennedy.

On the calendar are engraved the dates: October 16,

17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,

24, 25, 26, 27, and finally 28, were the dates when we

literally looked down the gun barrel

into nuclear war.

Under our cloak of deceit

the Soviet Union introduced nuclear missiles...

into Cuba,

targeting 90 million Americans.

The CIA said the warheads had not been delivered yet.

They thought 20 were coming on a ship named the Poltava.

We mobilized 180,000 troops.

The first day's air attack was planned at 1080 sorties...

a huge air attack.

Kennedy was trying to keep us out of war.

I was trying to help him keep us out of war.

And General Curtis LeMay, whom I served under,

as a matter of fact, in World War II, was saying:

"Let's go in. Let's totally destroy Cuba."

On that critical Saturday, October 27th,

we had two Khrushchev messages in front of us.

One had come in Friday night, and it had been dictated

by a man who was either drunk, or under tremendous stress.

Basically, he said, "If you'll guarantee you won't invade Cuba

we'll take the missiles out."

Then, before we could respond, we had a second message

that had been dictated by a bunch of hard-liners.

And it said, in effect, "If you attack...

we're prepared...

to confront you with masses of military power."

So, what to do? We had the--

I'll call it the soft message and the hard message.

At the elbow of President Kennedy was Tommy Thompson,

former U.S. ambassador to Moscow.

He and Jane, his wife, had literally lived with Khrushchev

and his wife upon occasion.

Tommy Thompson said, "Mr. President

I urge you to respond to the soft message."

The president said to Tommy,

"We can't do that. That'll get us nowhere."

Tommy said, "Mr. President, you're wrong."

Now, that takes a lot of guts.

In Thompson's mind was this thought:

"Khrushchev's gotten himself in a hell of a fix."

He would then think to himself,

"My God, if I can get out of this

with a deal that I can say to the Russian people:

'Kennedy was going to destroy Castro and I prevented it.'"

Thompson, knowing Khrushchev as he did, thought:

"Khrushchev will accept that."

And Thompson was right.

That's what I call empathy.

We must try to put ourselves inside their skin

and look at us through their eyes,

just to understand the thoughts

that lie behind their decisions and their actions.

Khrushchev's advisors were saying:

"There can be no deal

"unless you somewhat reduce the pressure on us

when you ask us to reduce the pressure on you."

Also, we had attempted to invade Cuba.

Well, with the Bay of Pigs.

That undoubtedly influenced their thinking.

I think that's correct.

But more importantly,

from a Cuban and a Russian point of view,

they knew what, in a sense, I really didn't know.

We had attempted to assassinate Castro

under Eisenhower and under Kennedy,

and later, under Johnson.

And in addition to that,

major voices in the U.S. were calling for invasion.

In the first message, Khrushchev said this:

"We and you ought not pull on the ends of a rope,

"which you have tied the knots of war.

"Because the more the two of us pull,

"the tighter the knot will be tied.

"And then it will be necessary to cut that knot,

"and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you.

"I have participated in two wars and know that war ends,

"when it has rolled through cities and villages

"everywhere sowing death and destruction.

"For such is the logic of war.

"If people do not display wisdom,

"they will clash like blind moles

and then mutual annihilation will commence."

I want to say, and this is very important:

At the end, we lucked out.

It was luck that prevented nuclear war.

We came that close to nuclear war at the end.

Rational individuals. Kennedy was rational.

Khrushchev was rational. Castro was rational.

Rational individuals came that close

to total destruction of their societies.

And that danger exists today.

The major lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is this:

The indefinite combination of human fallibility

and nuclear weapons will destroy nations.

Is it right and proper that today

there are 7500 strategic offensive nuclear warheads

of which 2500 are on 15-minute alert,

to be launched by the decision of one human being?

It wasn't until January, 1992,

in a meeting chaired by Castro in Havana, Cuba,

that I learned 162 nuclear warheads,

including 90 tactical warheads, were on the island at the time

in this critical moment of the crisis.

Uh...

I couldn't believe what I was hearing

and Castro got very angry with me, because I said:

"Mr. President, let's stop this meeting.

"This is totally new to me.

I'm not sure I got the translation right."

"Mr. President, I have three questions to you.

"Number one, did you know the nuclear warheads were there?

"Number two, if you did,

"would you have recommended to Khrushchev

"in the face of a U.S. attack, that he use them?

"Number three, if he had used them,

what would've happened to Cuba?"

He said, "Number one, I knew they were there.

"Number two, I would not have recommended to Khrushchev.

"I did recommend to Khrushchev that they be used.

"Number three, what would have happened to Cuba?

It would've been totally destroyed."

That's how close we were.

And he was willing to accept that?

Yes-- Oh, and he went on to say:

"Mr. McNamara, if you and President Kennedy

"had been in a similar situation,

that's what you would've done."

I said, "Mr. President, I hope to God

we would not have done it."

Pull the temple down on our heads? My God!